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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
ZONING: AESTHETICS:
THE CHAAMEON OF ZONING
A chameleon is an animal of remarkable talents. Though
at first glance a colorless ordinary-looking lizard, the chame-
leon when alarmed or moodily impelled displays extraordi-
nary legerdemain. He has the uncanny knack of blending in
or taking on the characteristics of his surroundings which
makes him nigh invisible.' The judicial treatment of aes-
thetics in zoning resembles the chameleon in its ability to
blend into its surroundings.
Before beginning the discussion of the problem of aes-
thetics in zoning, it is necessary to define terms. The inability
to place an exact meaning on the world aesthetics has vexed
the courts for many years. Its elusive qualities are graphic-
ally illustrated by the many and varied meanings attributed
to it. 2 An early case attempted to define the term but was
"According to Webster's New Intermediate Dictionary 447
(1950), "Chameleons are any one of a group of peacrodont
lizards having a laterally compressed body, prehensile tail,
and opposed digits. They are remarkable for the change of
color of skin, which are governed by nerve stimuli dependent
upon the mood of the animal as well as on surrounding con-
ditions .... "
".... The capacity of changing color, either on irritation or
to resemble surrounding objects is due to layers of contractile
pigment bearing cells which can be pressed toward the sur-
face of the skin, and to the inflation of air vessels in connection
with the lungs . . ." 1 Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dic-
tionary of the English Language 445 (1952).
"... Like the Chameleon, take the hue of the company you
are with.... ." Chesterfield, Letters, Vol ii, ccxiiif. 300 (1958).
2 The dictionary meanings of aesthetics seem to do no more
than add to the imprecision of the term. They uniformly agree,
however, that the word is undoubtedly multi-faceted having
different meanings for different persons. E.g. ".... Pertaining
to beauty, taste, or the fine arts, the philosophy of the beau-
tiful. Appreciating or loving the beautiful, engaged in the
culture of the fine arts, as an aesthetic nature." 1 Funk &
(Vol. 4, No. 1
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perhaps more honest than informative when it concluded
that the meaning was after all not entirely clear Jurists are
understandably disquieted when called upon to bestow legal
precision upon a word capable of many nuances, and engage
in the most subtle dialectics to find something other than
aesthetics in an ordinance to uphold it. 4
Wagnalls op. cit. supra note 1, at 854. "The word aesthetics,
in the latin form aesthetica was first used . . . to designate
the science of sensuous knowledge, whose goal is beauty, in
contrast with logic, whose goal is truth." Webster's New In-
ternational Dictionary 519 (1956). It seems to be generally
accepted that aesthetic considerations relate only to stimuli
received through the sense of sight. E.g., General Outdoor
Advertising Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 85, 172 N.E.
309 (1930); Accord, Meighan v. Birmingham Terminal Co.,
195 Ala. 591, 51 So. 775 (1910); Hay-A-Tampa Cigar Co.
v. Johnson, 149 Fla. 148, 5 So.2d 433 (1941). The majority
of judges and writers accept the word aesthetics at face value.
Very often the courts fall back on Webster's second variation of
the word: "Of or pertaining to the beautiful or distinguished
from the merely pleasing, the moral, and especially the use-
ful ... ." Many writers have ventured opinions and explana-
tions for the plethora of definitions. See, Bergs, Aesthestics As
a Justification For The Exercise Of The Police Power Or Emi-
nent Domain, 23 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 730 (1955); Dukeminier,
Zoning For Aesthetic Objectives; A Reappraisal, 20 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 218 (1955) Sayre, Aesthetics And Property
Value: Does Zoning Promote The Public Welfare? 35 A.B.A.J.
471 (1949); Light, Aesthetics In Zoning, 14 1Vini. L. REv. 109
(1930).
3 ".... [J]ust what is meant by the use of the term "aesthetic"
is not entirely clear; but apparently it is intended to designate
thereby matters which are evident to sight only, as distinguish-
ed from those discerned through smell or hearing.... Sundeen
v. Rogers 83 N.H. 253, 141 Atl. 142, 144 (1928).
4 E.g., in a decision upheld on other than aesthetic grounds, the
court stated ". . . It is commendable and desirable, but not
essential to the public need that our aesthetic desires be grati-
fied . .. ." City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co.,
112 Ohio St. 654, 148 N.E. 842, 844 (1925); Accord, Stoner Mc-
Cray System v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1313, 78 N.W.2d
'843 (1956); Pearce v. Village of Edina, 263 Minn. 553, 118
N.W.2d 659 (1962); City of Norris v. Bradford, 204 Tenn. 319,
321 S.W. 2d 543 (1959); see Annots., 141 A.L.R. 693 (1942); 117
A.L.R. 1117 (1938); 54 A.L.R. 1037 (1928).
19671
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It will be this traditional reticence that this Comment will
consider. Why have the courts shied away from decisions in
zoning cases based solely upon aesthetics? Why have jurists
been so willing to strike down zoning ordinances predicated
solely or greatly upon aesthetics and conversely uphold ordi-
nances on the primary basis of the police power but with
secondary aesthetic considerations? Have the courts' atti-
tudes in the area of aesthetics been undergoing a transition?
Finally, what is the present direction of judicial thinking in
this relatively new area? All of these questions may be
answered by a judicial awareness of the propriety of aes-
thetics in zoning; that aesthetics do not warrant the fate
of an unwanted orphan, but rather should be embraced by
the judicial rationale. Unfortunately, aesthetics for the most
part are effectively disguised or blended in, against the back-
ground of the police power particularly, or some other more
tenuous reason generally.
AEsETics IN ZONING: BACKGROUND
Aesthetic considerations standing alone have traditionally
been rejected by the courts as an attempt to subjectively in-
ject the nebulous concept of taste into the law. An Ohio
court' demonstrated this attitude in a highly sophisticated,
nonetheless logical manner, when it struck down an ordi-
nance creating part of the city into a restricted area as tak-
ing property without due process saying: ".... the public
view as to what is necessary for aesthetic progress greatly
varies. Certain legislatures might consider that it was more
5 It has been said that when an aesthetic purpose rather than the
public health or safety was sought to be served by a regulation,
it constituted a taking without compensation. Levy v. Mravlag,
96 N.J. Law 367, 115 A. 350 (1921); Accord, Olsen v. City of
Minneapolis, 263 Minn. 1, 115 N.W.2d 734 (1962); Romar
Realty Co. v. Bd. of Comm'rs. of Borough of Haddonfield,
96 N.J. Law 117, 114 AtI. 248 (1921); see generally, Symposium,
Aesthetic Control of Land Use: A House Built Upon the
Sand? 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 344 (1964-1965); Sayre, op. cit. supra
note 2; Chandler, The Attitude Of The Law Towards Beauty,
8 A.B.A.J. 470 (1922).
1 City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co. supra note 4.
[Vol. 4, No. 1
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important to cultivate a taste for jazz than for Beethoven,
for posters than for Rembrandt, and for limericks than for
Keats . . .-7 The cases are in agreement that if regulations
accomplishing aesthetic purposes are to be justified at all,
such justification must be found in the police power. The
police power has traditionally been the refuge of the courts
when they desired to be a partisan of aesthetics. But what is
this police power, that beauty has historically been merely
subordinate to?
The Supreme Court of the United States has defined the
police power of a state to be the sum total of the state's legis-
lative powers exercised within the constitutional limits of
due process of law.8 Under the court's definition, a municipal
ordinance would be valid if it is not "unreasonable, arbi-
trary, or capricious," and if the means selected to carry it
into effect "have a real and substantial relation to the object
sought to be attained."9 This interpretation has given rise to
much confusion in the field of zoning and played a major
part in relegating aesthetics to a greatly inferior role to the
police power. In keeping with this rather confused picture,
it has long been held that the purposes served by the police
power include the safeguarding of the public health, safety
and morals and more broadly the promotion of the general
welfare.10 The Supreme Court recognized that zoning is a
valid exercise of the police power and by intimation at least
hinted that aesthetics might be included as a silent partner,
when it held that an ordinance creating a residential district
excluding such establishments as apartment houses, business
houses and retail stores was a valid exercise of the police
power." However, in discusing the ordinance, the court ef-
7 Id. at , 148 N.E. at 844.
8 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); License Cases,
46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 582 (1847).
9 Nebbia v. New York, supra note 8, at 525.
10 E.g., Eubanks v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912);
Chicago B. & Q. Ry. v. Illinois ex rel. Grimwood, 200 U.S. 561
(1906); Detweiler v. Welch, 46 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1930);
affirming 46 F.2d 72 (D.D.C. 1930); McKay Jewelers Inc. v.
Bowron, 19 Cal. App.2d 595, 122 P.2d 543 (1942).
11Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
19671
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fectively discounted the idea of full recognition of aesthetics
when it explained that excluding such places from resi-
dential districts was not a declaration that they were nuis-
ances but a part of the general plan by which the city's terri-
tory is allotted to different uses in order to reduce congestion
and disorder seemingly inherent in unregulated city devel-
opment.12
Although the Euclid case legitimatized zoning as a proper
use of the police power, it appeared to serve as a judicial
strait jacket on the discretion of the courts. Zoning decisions
thereafter seemingly had to fall within the broad aegis of the
police powers or they were doomed to fail.3
BEAUTY OR PRAGMATISM?
It may be seen that the courts, though interested in jus-
tice, would not risk the epithet of "aesthete" in its pursuit.
The strongly practical trend that has long existed in the
American courts early made itself felt in zoning and related
cases. Many courts felt constrained to denounce aesthetics
as being out of place in the area of zoning. 4
The typical result of finding the action valid under the
police power but only incidentally related to aesthetics may
12 Id. at 392.
13 See generally, Agnor, Beauty Begins A Comeback: Aesthetic
Considerations in Zoning, 11 J. Pus. L. 260 (1962); Haley,
Aesthetic Considerations in Denying A Proposed Use, 3 VILL.
L. REv. 117 (1957); Sayre, op. cit. supra note 2.
14 A closely reasoned case seemed to leave no doubt of the court's
extremely doctrinaire approach in zoning. The court held that
wholly arbitrary restrictions upon the use of sections of a city
for other than residence and allied purposes having no logical
relation to the public welfare but resting solely upon aesthetic
grounds cannot be sustained under the police power. Goldman
v. Crowther, 147 Md. 282, 128 Atl. 50 (1925); Accord, State
Bank and Trust Co. v. Village of Wilmette, 358 Ill. 311, 193
N.E. 131 (1934); Frischkorn Constr. Co. v. Lambert, 315
Mich. 556, 24 N.W.2d 209 (1946); Olsen v. City of Minneapolis,
supra note 5; Baker v. Somerville, 138 Neb. 446, 293 N.W. 326
(1940).
[Vol. 4, No. I
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be found in a New York case dealing with the troublesome
problem of billboards. 5 The case held that the superinten-
dent of public works was justified in erecting a screen to
close off the view of a large advertising sign which was
erected by lessees of property near the approach to a bridge.
Here there clearly was a desire by the court to eliminate
an eyesore, a violator of the sense of beauty. This sign by its
very bulk and height offended the eye and the sensitivities.
The sign's location was in a singularly beautiful spot with
the majestic Hudson River in the background. The reluctance
of the court to uphold the ordinance on aesthetic considera-
tions alone was apparent. In fact, to become a supporter of
beauty but to do so in a sturdily pragmatic fashion was the
problem of the court. This was resolved adroitly:
The Supreme Court of the United States has held
that billboards may be prohibited in the interest of the
safety, morality, health, and decency of the community
... and that they may be excluded from residence dis-
tricts by zoning ordinances .... Beauty may not be
queen, but she is not an outcast beyond the pale of pro-
tection or respect. She may at least shelter herself under
the wing of safety, morality or decency.'(
Thus the court was able to justify its decision on the
basis of the police power but nonetheless recognizing that
aesthetics or beauty, if you will, did warrant recognition.
This solicitous regard for aesthetics was by no means shared
by all the courts of this period, but the PerImutter decision
pointed towards a relaxing of the singular role of the police
power by a recognition, albeit small, of aesthetics in zoning.
The term morality was often used by the courts interchange-
ably with the word welfare and it is within this context that
aesthetics was advanced, although under the pragmatic guise
of the police power.Y
'r Perlmutter v. Greene, 259 N.Y. 327, 182 N.E. 5 (1932).16 Id. at - , 182 N.E. at 6.
17 Typically, the cases usually mention that a court may ponder
aesthetic considerations as long as there are other elements
of public health, safety or welfare present. The term welfare
seems to be the "catch-all" used when aesthetics will fit in
handily under no other category of the police power. See
generally, People v. Calvar Corp., 69 N.Y.S.2d 272, affd. 286
19671
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It is clear enough in the great majority of zoning decisions
that one of the predominant purposes of zoning legislation
is the maintenance or improvement of community appear-
ance. But the courts have had to exercise remarkable powers
of imagination to find the legislative concern limited to the
police powers with welfare being an important adjunct,
even though the aesthetic considerations must have been
obvious.-' The passage of time, however, and the wide spread
use and acceptance of zoning has led inexorably to a greater
willingness of the courts to allow aesthetics to play an even
greater role in zoning decisions."0
AESTHETIc ZONING: PRESERVER OF THE PAST
Probably the closest the courts have come to a declara-
tion that aesthetic considerations in zoning may be para-
mount and not merely in the shade of the police power is
the preservation of historical sites. Here was a very touchy
problem. Certain towns or sections of cities in the United
States because of great historical significance were desired
to be preserved in their original condition. Thus, they would
serve as shrines and reflections of America's past. But how
to do this? As has been recounted, the courts uniformly
struck down zoning ordinances predicated on aesthetics
alone.20 The necessity and popular desire to preserve the his-
torical areas appeared to provide the impetus for the courts
to rise to the occasion. Although these regulations and ordi-
nances protecting these areas were superficially grounded on
N.Y. 419 (1949); Appeal of Kerr, 294 Pa. 246, 144 Atl. 81(1928); State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland,
269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955).
'
8 E.g., Haley, op. cit., supra note 13; 58 Am. JuR. Zoning § 30
(1948).
19 It has been held that zoning regulations may extend beyond
strict considerations of health and safety, and will include
aesthetic considerations. E.g., United Advertising Corp. v.
Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 447 (1964); Baker
v. Elkin, 80 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1948); State ex rel. American Oil
Co. v. Bessent, 27 Wis.2d 537, 135 N.W.2d 317 (1965); see
Bard, Aesthetics and City Planning, 1-9 (Citizens Union Re-
search Foundation 1957).
20- See cases cited note 5 supra,
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the police power, one would not have to scratch very deeply
to find the real consideration-aesthetics!
One of the earliest of the areas protected by zoning regu-
lations was the "Vieux Carre" in New Orleans. The zoning
requirements here were focused on the preservation of the
exterior architectural design of the section. They concerned
and touched on existing buildings as well as new construc-
tion. Since this was a highly popular tourist attraction,
historical as well as lucrative, a provision of the state con-
stitution was proposed and ratified by popular referendum
fixing the boundaries of the area. This zoning plan gave little
trouble to the Louisiana court which found it completely
valid.2'
In City of New Orleans v. Impastato,22 the defendant, in
enlarging a small lavatory attached to the rear of his build-
ing, could surely not be accused of endangering the health,
safety or welfare of the community. The court, therefore,
met the challenge while commenting on the Vieux Carre's
commission power to regulate and control the historic value
of the buildings situated in the Vieux Carre section:
to that end the Commission shall be given such power
and duties as the Commission Council of the City of
New Orleans shall deem fit and necessary. This we think
is sufficient to include all reasonable regulations made
by the City rejecting changes to be made to the outside
of any building situated in the Vieux Carre section
which fronts on a public street ... 23
The Louisiana court had more or less blazed the trail
for this decision some years before, but in a less direct man-
ner. In upholding an act authorizing regulation of build-
ings, business styles and construction, the court defended
aesthetics in a rather forthright manner for the times. 4 A
more recent Louisiana case has recognized the effect of
21 City of New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953);
City of New Orleans v. Impastato, 198 La. 206, 3 So. 2d 559(1941); City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So.
2d 129 (1941).
22 198 La. 206, 3 So. 2d 559 (1941).
28 Id. at-, 3 So. 2d at 561.
24
,"The beauty of a fashionable residence neighborhood in a city
is for the comfort and happiness of the residents, and it sustains
19671
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aesthetic considerations on the value of a neighborhood as
a tourist attraction.25 In the interest of preserving the his-
torical flavor of the community, the defendant was fined for
displaying an improperly lighted sign of excessive size and
for building a pink plastic enclosure on his property. This
restriction upon property use was held not violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment. To the argument that the ordinance
was unlawfully based upon aesthetics, the court gave a re-
markable and illuminating discussion of how aesthetics and
the police power may be co-existent.26
Zoning for purposes of aesthetics as a valid exercise of
the police power has been used in other historic projects
around the country.27 It is interesting to note that in Wil-
liamsburgh, Va., the power of zoning was used in a restored
area rather than to preserve an area. Here, once the area
was restored, and being privately owned land, a consider-
able portion of the city's comprehensive plan dealt with
aesthetic considerations peculiar to this area.28 It would
appear that from the standpoint of candor, the ordinance
was upheld on aesthetic grounds, recognizing this to be a
valid and necessary exercise of the police power.
The police power has long been used to regulate such
things as height, minimum area restrictions, set back re-
quirements and the placement of billboards and frontage in
buildings and structures.29 Since billboard regulations have
in a general way the value of property in the neighborhood....
Why should not the police power avail, as well to suppress or
prevent a nuisance committed by offending the sense of sight,
as to suppress or prevent a nuisance committed by offending
the sense of hearing or the olfactory nerves? . . ." State ex rel.
Civello v. New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440, 444 (1923).
25 City of New Orleans v. Levy, supra note 21.261d. at - , 64 So. 2d at 802, 803.
27 E.g., Comment, Aesthetic Zoning: Preservation of Historic
Areas, 29 FORDHAm L. REv. 729 (1961); Rodda, The Accomp-
lishment Of Aesthetic Purposes Under The Police Power, 27
So. CAL. L. REv. 149 (1953-1954).2 5 Agnor, op. cit. supra note 13.29 E.g., Haar and Mystelka, Planning and Zoning, Zoning Digest
(1961); Annots., 96 A.L.R.2d 1366 (1964); 95 A.L.R.2d 717
(1964).
[Vol. 4, No. 1
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OTHER CONSMERATIONS
been briefly touched on previously,30 the other aforemen-
tioned factors will show the close relationship of aesthetics
to the police power. The direction of the courts toward a
gradual strengthening of an independent position of aes-
thetics should also be noted.
A. Height
Generally, long before zoning regulations were used, the
height of buildings and structures was restricted through the
use of the police power.3' The realization that disparity in the
height of structures could not only create a lack of uniform-
ity but also a great deal of ugliness, burst early upon the
courts. Prior to the awakening, however, the attitude of the
courts might be summed up in an early case32 which award-
ed damages to a petitioner injured by a statute restricting
structural height. In speaking of the statute, Chief Justice
Holmes said: ".... Such a law certainly would present grave
difficulties even when approached with all the presumptions
that exist in favor of a legislative decision, and with the
duty to uphold it unless it was impossible to do so ....,,3
It appears evident that the recognition of aesthetics in
this area would be painful since the courts traditionally dis-
played a strong aversion to interference with property
rights of any kind. A case which illustrated the chameleon-
like qualities of aesthetics and the desire of the courts to
recognize aesthetics but only by subtle justification was
Welch v. Swasey.34 The case concerned a limitation upon
the height of buildings to be erected in Boston. The court
found that the regulation was a reasonable effort to pro-
mote the public safety by preventing the uncontrollable
30 Perlmutter v. Greene, supra note 15.
31 See 101 C.J.S. Zoning § 36 (1958); 58 Am. Jun. Zoning § 30
(1948). ,32 Parker v. Commonwealth, 178 Mass. 199, 59 N.E. 634 (1901).
33 Id. at - , 59 N.E. at 635.
34 193 Mass. 364, 79 N.E. 745 (1909).
19671
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spread of fire among tall buildings and in so doing was a
valid exercise of the police power. Interestingly enough, the
court sustained the insertion of aesthetics in the case by
first condemning the concept. 5 Although appealed, the gen-
eral rule was enunciated that if the primary purpose of a
restriction upon property rights was to protect the public
health, safety or welfare, the toleration of a secondary aes-
thetic aim was permissible. In general, this is the rule today
in regards height restriction in zoning. The Welch case
blazed the trail to attacks upon less than beautiful skylines
elsewhere.36
B. Minimum Area Restrictions
Many modern zoning ordinances contain provisions
which in one form or another regulate the area size upon
which a house may be built.37 Minimum lot frontage and
area provisions are now fairly commonplace. In this field
of zoning, aesthetics undoubtedly plays a vital role. Al-
85 ". . . The inhabitants of a city or town cannot be compelled
to give up rights in property or to pay taxes for purely aesthetic
objects; but if the primary and substantive purpose of the legis-
lation is such as justifies the act, considerations of taste and
beauty may enter in as auxiliary .... " Id. at- , 79 N.E. at
746.
36 E.g., Brougher v. Bd. of Pub. Works of San Francisco, 107 Cal.
App. 15, 290 Pac. 140 (1930; Main Street Corp. v. City of
Brockton, 323 Mass. 646, 84 N.E.2d 13 (1949); Fey v. Woer-
mann, 360 Mo. 728, 230 S.W.2d 681 (1950); Pritz v. Messer,
112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925); Annots., 93 A.L.R. 2d 1254
(1964); 8 A.L.R.2d 970,971 (1949).37E.g., McKusick v. Houghton, 177 Minn. 231, 213 N.W. 907
(1927); Lewis v. Board of Comm'rs of Borough of Avon-By-
The-Sea, 7 N.J. Misc. 27, 143 Atl. 865 (1928); Hayes v. Hoff-
man, 192 Wis. 63, 211 N.W. 271 (1927). In one case the ordi-
nance called for the average depth of a house not to exceed
25 feet of front yards of buildings fronting on one side of the
street between two cross streets. Compliance with this regu-
lation required the moving back from the street of a building
placed within five and one-half feet of the front property line,
where the average setback of existing buildings was 21 feet.
City of Bismarck v. Hughes, 53 N.D. 838, 208 N.W. 711 (1926).
JVol. 4, No. 1
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though still undertaken under the exercise of the police
power, aesthetics is more readily seen. A great many mini-
mum area restrictions were enacted to make sure that
smaller, less expensive homes were not built in a com-
munity, thereby lessening the beauty and value of the neigh-
borhood propertyys Undoubtedly, when there is an extreme-
ly low minimum area restriction prescribed, this could well
have a direct bearing on the welfare of the community and
as such would be an appropriate occasion for the exercise
of the police power. However, as the area prescriptions be-
come larger, the need for the use of the police power in the
general welfare correspondingly decreases.
It is usually held that aesthetics may be an incident, but
cannot be the moving factor in determining the validity of
a zoning ordinance prescribing a minimum area for house
lots or requiring an area proportionate to the number of
families to be housed. 9 It is interesting to observe that in
Billbar Construction Co. v. East-Town Tp. Bd. of Adjust-
ment,40 the court made the observation that: ".... Since, with
the passing of time, urban and suburban planning has be-
come an accredited adjunct of municipal government, aes-
thetic considerations have progressively become more and
more persuasive as sustaining reasons for the exercise of
the police power. ' 41 It appears that the learned judge, even
at the recent time of this case, feared that the epithet "aes-
thete" might be hurled at him, and so clothed his decision
in the respectable garb of the police power.
One might say regarding minimum area restriction in
zoning, that aesthetics takes on less the color of the police
38 E.g., Lionshead Lake Inc. v. Wayne Tp., 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d
693 (1952).
39See generally, Hitchman v. Oakland Tp., 329 Mich. 331, 45
N.W.2d 306 (1951); Billbar Constr. Co. v. East-Town Tp. Bd.
of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958).
40 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958).
41 Id. at -, 141 A.2d at 857.
19671
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power and more that of economic considerations. This prop-
osition seems apparent in Chicago City Bank & Trust Co. v.
Highland Park.4 This case involved the application of a
provision of a city ordinance requiring a minimum lot area
of 1,500 square feet per family to a building in the central
business district having retail stores on the ground floor
and apartments on the second and third floors. It was held
that whether the merchants would benefit by the increased
business patronage of people in the additional fourth-floor
apartments proposed to be constructed was a factor to be
weighed by the city council rather than the courts. We can
see that aesthetic considerations were handily over-shad-
owed by a concern for the economic. The landmark case of
Lionshead Lake v. Wayne Tp.,43 indicated the over-powering
role economics plays in minimum area regulations with aes-
thetics playing "understudy" as it were. Judge Oliphant's
dissent in that case vigorously attacks the majority opinion
as based on maintenance of the health of the community.
The judge mentions that the 768 square feet of space re-
quired as the minimum for single family residence by the
particular zoning ordinance appeared to be well beyond
what is necessary for the health of a community. He sug-
gests what is perhaps the rationale for most of the modern
zoning minimum area requirements, i.e. economics with aes-
thetics second. He unequivocally states that the real motive
for the ordinance was to keep less financially favored citi-
zens out of the rather exclusive Lionshead Lake area." The
excessively large area requirements would preclude all but
large houses which could be erected only by the financially
fortunate. Thus, in one fell swoop, the ordinance insures
that only the "right" people emigrate to the community hav-
ing the money to erect an aesthetically acceptable dwelling.
The majority in this case did stretch the police powers con-
429 IMI. 2d 364, 137 N.E.2d 835 (1956) cert. denied, 353 U.S. 922
(1957).
43 Supra note 38.
44 The court feels that the average citizen suffers not because of
any acts they do or conditions they create, but simply because
the income of the family won't permit building a house large
enough to conform to the zoning requirements. It concludes
(Vol. 4, No. 1
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siderably in sustaining the ordinance, however, no further
than in most jurisdictions at that time.
C. Set Back Requirements
The restrictions on set back lines were upheld rather
early under the general exercise of the police power.5 Al-
though ostensibly for the public welfare and thus a proper
exercise of the police power, aesthetics most assuredly played
a role in the judicial considerations.
Set back requirements were usually a part of a compre-
hensive zoning plan to beautify a community. Thus while
requiring conformity in the name of the police power, aes-
thetics was truly important; else why beautify a city? Zoning
ordinances frequently contain a provision requiring front
yards in designated districts to have a minimum depth or
the buildings to have a minimum setback from the street
or curb line.48 Sometimes a building line is provided for as
established by a specified percentage of the buildings on the
block on the same side of the street.4 The validity of a pro-
vision of a zoning ordinance forbidding owners of property
in certain zones to construct buildings thereon nearer than a
specified distance from the line of the bordering public
street4' or requiring such buildings to be in line with adja-
cent property with reference to distance from the street has
been sustained as a proper exercise of the police power. 9
In other cases, zoning ordinance provisions for a setback
from the street or property line have been regarded as void
that these families will be relegated most likely, to living in
large cities or in multiple family dwellings against what they
consider to be the welfare of their immediate families. Id. at
,89 A.2d at 701.
4s See cases cited note 37 supra.
46E.g., Bjork v. Safford, 333 IMI. 355, 164 N.E. 699 (1928);
Wuffsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 150 N.E. 120 (1925).47Appeal of White, 287 Pa. 259, 134 Adt. 409 (1926).
48 See cases cited note 45 supra; see Annots, 117 A.L.R. 1117
(1938); 86 A.L.R. 659 (1933); 43 A.L.R. 670 (1926).
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upon such grounds as the absence of authority of the mu-
nicipality,50 or violation of the provisions of the zoning en-
abling act requiring the zoning ordinance to be in accord
with a well-considered plan."1 Provisions have also been
voided on constitutional grounds based on the absence of
any relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare.52 In the last of the foregoing grounds we find the
seeds of the upholding as well as the destruction of aesthetics
in these cases.
Pritz v. Messer," laid down the proposition that although
aesthetic considerations cannot justly form the basis for the
exercise of the police power in establishing set back lines,
they may be taken into consideration as ancillary to other
purposes within the appropriate sphere of the police pow-
er.5 '4 For the most part, this represents the majority view
today and by and large allows the court some flexibility in
zoning ordinance interpretation. However, it still leaves
much to be desired. If aesthetic reasons may be ancillary, can
they ever be paramount? If they can't become paramount,
why not? Are not aesthetic reasons per se persuasive enough
to permit the exercise of the police power for beauty alone?
Must beauty as an aesthetic concept be perpetually forced
to seek shelter under the protective shadow of the police
power? Disappointingly, a recent Pennsylvania case 5 seems
to provide an answer to at least some of the aforementioned
queries. In that case, it was argued that a setback ordinance
50 Willison v. Cooke, 54 Colo. 320, 130 Pac. 828 (1913).
1 1Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra note 11.
52 E.g., Gait v. Cook County, 405 Ill. 396, 91 N.E.2d 395 (1950);
Steward v. City of Trenton, 9 N.J. Misc. 1100, 156 Atl. 844
(1931); Van Auken v. Kimmey, 141 MVisc. 105, 252 N.Y.S. 329
(1930); Schmalz v. Buckingham Tp. Zoning Bd. of Adjust-
ment, 389 Pa. 295, 132 A.2d 233 (1957).
53 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925).
54Id. at - , 149 N.E. at 30.
55 National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597
(1965).
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was invalid on the basis that its sole consideration was aes-
thetic. The court said in upholding this contention:
There is no doubt that many of the residents of this
area are highly desirous of keeping it the way it is, pre-
ferring, quite naturally, to look out upon land in its nat-
ural state rather than on other homes. These desires
however, do not rise to the level of public welfare. This
is purely a matter of private desire which zoning regu-
lation may not be employed to effectuate ... 5
Even though this case seems to restrict rather than expand
the beneficient rule enunciated in Pritz v. Messer,5 7 in re-
gards aesthetics in zoning, there is no doubt that the courts
are ever expanding this rule. Hopefully, there will be even
greater future expansion in this direction.
OKAHo _A: AEsTBrTIc ZONING CONSmERATIONS
It was early held in Oklahoma that for the purpose of
promoting the health, safety, morals and general wel-
fare of the community, the legislative body could impose
regulations in land use planning.58 The statutory language
is very clear in the delegation of the zoning authority to cities
and incorporated villages."9 This statutory language as broad
as it appears giving great powers in the area of zoning to
cities and incorporated villages, was upheld by the Okla-
homa Supreme Court in State ex rel. Hunzicker v. Pulliam.9
In that case in speaking of zoning ordinances, the court stated
that they are police power enactments designed for promo-
tion and perpetuation of people's moral and material wel-
6 Id. at -, 215 A.2d at 611.
5T Supra note 53.
58 OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 401 (1961).
s ... the legislative body of cities and incorporated villages is
hereby empowered to regulate and restrict the height, number
of stories and size of buildings and other structures, the per-
centage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts
and other open spaces, the density of population, and the
location and use of buildings, structures and land for trade,
industry, residence or other purposes .... ." Ibid.
00 168 Okla. 632, 37 P.2d 417 (1934).
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fare which cities are authorized to enact by virtue of the
provisions in the Constitution and law of the state."1
It appears that the Oklahoma courts have not passed on
the validity of aesthetics in zoning considerations. The cases
in this area usually are decided solely on the basis of the
police power without mention or reference to aesthetics.6 2
No cases have been found which even allude to the existence
of aesthetics. However, as in all zoning cases, inferences
may be made from the nature of cases and from the judicial
language used. It seems that in regards certain questions, the
ancillary topic of beauty was touched on remotely and prob-
ably served as the basis, albeit hidden, for the decision. It
is believed that this basis will be more readily seen if one ac-
cepts the theory that aesthetic considerations in zoning are
nothing more than the legal evolution and growth of the
concept of the nuisance. 3 Once accepted, this theory permits
aesthetics to be seen in cases involving garages, filling sta-
tions, funeral homes, and area and frontage considerations.
The theory was rather apparent in an early Oklahoma
case.64 The case concerned the authority of the city to en-
force an ordinance prohibiting the erection of gasoline filling
stations in a certain district. In upholding the ordinance, the
court ostensibly fell back on the police power but seemingly
relied more heavily on a nuisance theory. It quoted with ap-
proval from the language of Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Wright,6 5 an earlier zoning case in which it was said of
nuisances:
11 Id. at - , 37 P.2d at 425.
62 E.g., Cauvel v. City of Tulsa, 368 P.2d 660 (Okla. 1962); City
of Tulsa v. Swanson, 366 P. 2d 629 (Okla. 1961); Beveridge v.
Harper & Turner Oil Trust, 168 Okla. 609, 35 P.2d 435 (1934);
In re Dawson, 136 Okla. 113, 277 Pac. 226 (1929); Marland
Refining Co. v. City of Hobart, 113 Okla. 36, 237 Pac. 857
(1925).6 3 See, Kucera, The Legal Aspects of Aesthetics in Zoning, 1
Instit. on Planning and Zoning 21 (1961).6 4 City of Muskogee v. Morton, 128 Okla. 17, 261 Pac. 183 (1927).
65 124 Okla. 55, 254 Pac. 41 (1927).
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A grant of power to a municipality to declare what shall
constitute a nuisance and to remove same while it does
not empower the municipality to declare a thing a nuis-
ance which is clearly not one, does empower it to
declare anything a nuisance which by reason of its
location or use, or local conditions and surroundings
may or does, become a serious obstruction to the use
of the streets for public purposes, or is a nuisance
within the common law or statutory definition .... 66
We may, therefore, see that the Oklahoma court early
seemed to have accepted the idea that the declaration of
nuisances and the upholding of zoning ordinances often go
hand in hand. Since the abolition of nuisances in many
cases leads to the beautification of an area, one can readily
see the chameleon-like character of aesthetics being formed
against a background of these cases. The nuisance theory
was relied upon by plaintiffs in Weaver v. Bishop,67 to en-
join construction of a filling station in a mainly residential
district. The court appeared to lean heavily towards the
plaintiff's theory that the station would detract from the
beauty of the mainly residential area. Reluctantly, the court,
while acknowledging that the plaintiff's contentions held
great weight, found for the defendant. This was done on
the grounds that the area in question was zoned commercial
earlier and thus the building of the station could not be
enjoined. Here, however, we find the court partial to-
wards the idea of maintaining beauty but too timorous to
sustain it legally.
The attitude of the Oklahoma courts towards aesthetics
may be clearly seen in cases dealing with undertaking estab-
lishments. It is clear that in enjoining their building or
operation in residential areas, the courts find it most diffi-
cult to use the subterfuge of the police power. What can
be less offensive from the standpoint of nuisance or even
from the view of a zoning ordinance than the operation of
a modern funeral home? No offensive odors or even views
66 Id. at - , 254 Pac. at 43.
67 174 Okla. 492, 52 P.2d 853 (1935).
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present themselves to the area. The landscaping and well-
built appearance of most funeral homes do credit to any
community. It is clear that the courts in denying the oper-
ation of a funeral home do so regardless of their reasoning
mainly with the view of protecting sensibilities. What is
the sensibility that is protected? Merely the court's view
that the constant reminder of death tends to depress one
and lower the spirits. Is this not an aesthetic consideration?
Is remedying these ills a proper exercise of the police pow-
er? May the courts remedy these and still maintain the fic-
tion that aesthetics may only be a secondary but never a
primary consideration? Apparently the Oklahoma courts
answer affirmatively. In Jordan v. Nesmith, 08 a case decided
on a nuisance theory rather than zoning violation seemingly
set the trend. In that case it was shown that a funeral home
and morgue were more than 125 feet from the nearest dwell-
ing of the plaintiffs and the evidence showed that they
would be in no danger of contracting communicable dis-
eases or discomfort from odors or fumes escaping from the
premises. Further, it was shown that the defendants in-
tended to construct their funeral home so that the unload-
ing of bodies would not be exposed to view. 9 This notwith-
standing, an injunction to restrain the maintenance of such
an establishment was granted, when it was shown that the
establishment was located in an exclusively residential sec-
tion of the city. Here the court showed its concern for aes-
thetics although not in so many words when it commented
on the depressing effect the business would have on the im-
mediate neighborhood. Capping this was the court's con-
cern for the lowered desirability of the surrounding prop-
erties.
A subsequent case 70 upholding the validity of a zoning
ordinance adopted the rationale of the Jordan decision. Here
the defendants sought to question the validity of a zoning
ordinance which denied the request for a permit to conduct
68 132 Okla. 226, 269 Pac. 1096 (1928).
69 Id. at - , 269 Pac. at 1099.
70 In re Dawson, 136 Okla. 113, 277 Pac. 226 (1929).
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funeral homes. The court went into a long and arduous ex-
planation of how allowing the funeral home would violate
the spirit of the zoning ordinance. However, its argument
was long, tenuous and rather unconvincing. One receives
the feeling from the court's reasoning that it felt that the
funeral home would offend the delicate feelings of the neigh-
borhood and shouldn't be allowed. Is this not an aesthetic
consideration? As usual, this rather apparent concern for
a feeling more abstruse than legal was concealed even though
the court was hard put to explain why a grocery store and
not a funeral home was granted a variance. The court rather
weakly explained:
The board may have made a mistake in granting the
permit to operate the grocery store in this zone ....
Under the evidence in the case at bar, the board of ad-justment doubtless found that no unnecessary hardship
existed and the maintenance of undertaking parlors
in the restricted zone would not be in conformity with
the spirit of the zoning ordinance and would be con-
trary to the building intent .... i
Other decisions seem to bolster the idea that the Okla-
homa courts really do acknowledge the existence of aes-
thetics, although admittedly in a circumspect manner.7j 2
In Oklahoma City v. Barclay,7" involving changing the zon-
ing of two lots from residential to commercial and extend-
ing the commercial zone into a residential district, the court
struck down the zoning. Here, although done in the name
of the police power, the court relied very strongly on facts
which could have their basis in nothing but aesthetics in
the broad meaning of the term. 4 In a recent case,75 the facts
were that an engineer was carrying on his profession in an
71 Id. at- , 277 Pac. at 229, 230.
72 E.g., Oklahoma City v. Barclay, 359 P.2d 237 (Okla. 1961);
Application of Shadid, 205 Okla. 462, 238 P.2d 794 (1951);
Modern Builder Inc. v. Bldg. Inspector of City of Tulsa, 197
Okla. 80, 168 P.2d 883 (1946); Howard v. Mahoney, 188 Okla.
89, 106 P.2d 267 (1940).
73 359 P.2d 237 (Okla. 1961).
7In describing the additions into which the lots in question
would be extended, the court states: ".... that the entire addi-
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unobtrusive manner in his home, allegedly in violation of
the zoning ordinance. It appears that he carried on his pro-
fession in his home in a residentially zoned area with the
knowledge and apparent approval of his neighbors. How-
ever, when plaintiff converted the space in his garage and
added to an adjoining playroom, he aroused fears that the
residential character or aesthetic picture of the community
might change. Believing that this would bring on an influx
of clients, thereby spoiling the residential character of the
neighborhood as well as violating the zoning ordinance, the
court ordered the plaintiff to cease practicing his profes-
sion at home. While invoking the familiar police power, the
court appeared more eager to restrain the plaintiff on aes-
thetic rather than other grounds."
It may be seen from an examination of the cases that
the Oklahoma courts are generally in accord with the re-
sults obtained in most jurisdictions in zoning cases. How-
ever, the reasoning and logic employed to arrive at these
decisions in other jurisdictions are rarely used by the Okla-
homa courts. It has been shown that a great majority of juris-
dictions are becoming increasingly bold in the recognition of
aesthetics in zoning considerations. The chameleon-like
character of aesthetics is now taking on a more definite hue.
There is an increasing tendency to recognize that aesthetics
per se without the crutch of the police power may be all
that is necessary to sustain a zoning ordinance. It may be
said, in conclusion, that the Oklahoma courts do take aes-
thetics into consideration by smuggling aesthetic effects
into their rulings and garbing them in the less controversial
mantle of the police power.
Vincent R. O'Neill
tion in the north-east corner of the intersection except the two
lots in question, contain lots which are improved with single
family, brick dwellings, and landscaped, have nice lawns,
shrubs, flowers and trees and are well-cared for; that the addi-
tion is a quiet, well-developed, well-planned, well-improved
and orderly residential district ..... ." Id. at 242.
75 Cauvel v. City of Tulsa, supra note 62.
T Id. at 662-63.
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